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Realism and Representation: The Case of Rembrandt’s 
Hat 
Michael Morris 
Abstract: Some artistic representations—the painting of a hat in a famous picture by Rembrandt is an example—
are able to present vividly the character of what they represent precisely by calling attention to their medium of 
representation.  There is a puzzle about this whose structure, I argue, is analogous to that of a familiar Kantian 
problem for traditional realism.  I offer a precise characterization of the puzzle, before arguing that an analogue 
for the case of representation to the Kantian solution to the problem for traditional realism is implausible.  I 
offer an alternative solution to the puzzle about representation which also explains why we should be interested 
in artistic representation in the first place.  I close with the outline of a possible realist response to the traditional 
Kantian problem. 
 
1. The Problem 
In the famous self-portrait in Kenwood House in London, Rembrandt is wearing a soft 
(though possibly starched) cloth hat.  My concern is with the way the hat is painted, and what 
that way of painting achieves.  The hat is painted in thick paint, with brushstrokes of 
astonishing simplicity and confidence.  Creamy white paint is applied thickly, almost in slabs, 
not always covering the darker wash beneath.  It is impossible not to notice the use of the 
paint: it calls attention to itself.  But precisely in calling attention to itself it succeeds in 
vividly depicting something distinct from it, something in the real world: a certain kind of hat 
made of a certain kind of cloth, whose texture is quite unlike that of the greasy paint in the 
picture.  Somehow the very conspicuousness of the way of painting reveals vividly the quite 




 This case is interesting because it is an example of a general phenomenon: artistic 
representations are often particularly effective at presenting the character of something in the 
real world precisely in virtue of calling attention to some feature of the medium of 
representation—and so, one might think, distracting one’s attention from the real world.  The 
phenomenon is very obvious in the surface of paintings like the Rembrandt self-portrait, but 
it can also be found in striking effects of composition in all representational art forms, as well 
as in features peculiar to different representational media. 
 There is clearly a psychological question of how it is that this effect is created, but 
that is not my concern.  My concern is with the philosophical question of how it is possible 
for an artistic representation which calls attention to itself nevertheless to represent so vividly 
a feature of the real world.  I will argue that the fundamental problem here is structurally 
similar to a problem in general metaphysics which Kantians have taken to undermine a 
traditional form of realism.  But the parallel for the case of artistic representation to the 
Kantian solution to the problem in general metaphysics is just not plausible.  So I offer an 
alternative solution to the problem in artistic representation.  This provides at least the 
structure of a possible non-Kantian solution to the problem in general metaphysics, which 
would remove the difficulty which Kantians have taken to undermine traditional realism. 
 
2. What the Issue is Not 
In order to see that the philosophical issue here is structurally similar to a problem in general 
metaphysics, we need to keep it separate from a number of more familiar issues in 
philosophical aesthetics.   
Our problem is to understand how it is that precisely in virtue of calling attention to 
its own medium an artistic representation can be good as a way of depicting something in the 
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real world.  That immediately separates this issue from anything that might be raised in 
connection with Richard Wollheim’s famous ‘twofold thesis’—the thesis that a proper 
appreciation of a painting requires one to experience simultaneously both the painted surface 
and what is ‘seen-in’ it (Wollheim 1980: 213-4).  The key point is that the fundamental 
relation I am concerned with is not the same as the one Wollheim is concerned with.  This is 
because Wollheim is trying to characterize ‘seeing-in’, and what is ‘seen-in’ a painting, in 
Wollheim’s sense, is something which (to put it reasonably cautiously) need not be a real 
thing of its kind.  Someone may ‘see- ’ a naked boy ‘in’ a painting, for example,1 even if 
there is no real boy of whom the painting is a painting.
2
  In this respect, what is ‘seen-in’ a 




 But the problem I am concerned with is quite unlike this: it is a problem about the 
relation between the medium of representation and something which is a real thing of its 
kind—in our case a certain kind of real cloth, and a certain kind of real hat.4   The whole 
point is that it is a real kind of cloth and a real kind of hat. (And, of course, I move to 
speaking of kinds of cloth and hat precisely to be sure that there really are such things.)   
Since the problem I am concerned with should not be aligned with what is involved in 
‘seeing-in’ in Wollheim’s sense, a fortiori it should not assimilated to the issue of what has 
been called ‘inflected seeing-in’.  Robert Hopkins’s helpful account describes ‘inflected 
seeing-in’ as ‘seeing-in’ for which ‘what is seen-in a surface includes properties a full 
characterization of which needs to make sense of that surface’s design (conceived as such)’ 
(Hopkins 2010: 158).  ‘Inflected seeing-in’ requires a special intimacy between the surface 
(as it is experienced) and what is ‘seen-in’ it, but it remains a relation (or experienced relation) 
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between the surface of a painting and something which (still following the earlier formulation) 
need not be a real thing of its kind; so it is irrelevant to our problem.
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Our problem is this: how can calling attention to the medium be good precisely as a 
way of vividly depicting the real world?  Of course, depictions of the real world can be good 
in all kinds of way.  A certain use of paint, for example, might be just intrinsically attractive, 
quite independently of what it is used to depict.  It might be, for example, that we just 
naturally like certain colours and textures.  And perhaps Rembrandt’s use of paint in the 
depiction of the hat here is attractive in just this kind of way.  If that were so, then perhaps we 
could explain how this use of paint might be instrumentally effective in a depiction of a hat: 
the intrinsic attractiveness of the colour and the texture of the paint might be enough to hold 
our eye, and as a result we are made to dwell on the picture and so, perhaps, learn more about 
the hat which is depicted.   
 Or again, we might see in the brushwork something of the character of the gesture 
which created it: the gesture was bold and flamboyant, we might think, and we take the 
brushwork to be bold and flamboyant too.  Why should we not think that ways of depicting 
which express features of character which we admire are good ways of depicting?  We 
admire boldness and flamboyance, so it seems reasonable to think that bold and flamboyant 
painting is a good way of depicting something. 
 But neither of these virtues of depiction is the virtue I have in mind, and attending to 
them has no obvious relevance to the problem I am concerned with.  The reason is that 
neither of these virtues is specific: each is simply a virtue in a way of painting as a way of 
depicting something or other.  It does not matter what is depicted in that way: these virtues, 
insofar as they are virtues, will enhance the value of a way of painting, whatever is depicted 
in that way of painting.  But the point about Rembrandt’s way of painting his hat was 
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 Again: the problem I am concerned with is relatively localized.  There are, of course, 
other ways in which the apparent boldness and flamboyance of the brushwork are plausibly 
seen both as central to the painting’s artistic aims, and as concerned with its relation to the 
real world.  These strong, broad strokes, which we might naturally take to be expressive of 
defiance, contrast strikingly but productively with the unblinking steadiness of the gaze of the 
man who looks back from the canvas.  The complex attitudes here expressed in the picture 
are naturally thought to be important in the depiction of something real: something complex 
about the human situation, for example.  But our problem concerns a separable relation 
between just one part of the painting and the real world: the use of those brushstrokes to 
depict a real-world kind of hat. 
 There is one issue of central importance to contemporary philosophical aesthetics 
which is relevant to our problem, however.  As I said at the outset, this feature of this 
painting is interesting as an example of a more general phenomenon.  Wherever we can make 
sense of a medium of representation, we should be able to find examples of artistic 
representations which are good at representing something real—something clearly external to 
representation—precisely because they call attention to the medium of representation.7  If this 
virtue is to be found in all forms of artistic representation, then making sense of it should 
have a benefit beyond that of just solving a philosophical problem: we might hope to explain 
something, at least, of the point of engaging in and with artistic representation at all—to 




3. Making the Problem Explicit 
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Our problem is a problem of a familiar philosophical kind: we want to know how anything 
could work in this way.  The source of this kind of philosophical problem is a latent, 
undiagnosed tension in our views: we have the vague feeling that we hold assumptions which 
contradict each other, although we are not yet clear what they are.
9
  We get properly clear 
about a problem of this kind by identifying the apparently contradictory assumptions 
explicitly.  That is what we need to do now. 
 First, let us introduce some terminology.  Let us call ways of representing the real 
world which call attention to their own medium of representation conspicuous ways of 
representing, or conspicuous representations.   And we are concerned with a particular virtue 
of conspicuous representations: the virtue which remains once we have discounted simple 
gustatory values (such as delight in the texture of the paint, just as such), and any values that 
might be associated with expression (such as the value of the flamboyance or boldness of a 
gesture).  Let us call this the basic virtue of these representations. 
 What kind of virtue might this basic virtue of conspicuous representations be?  It is a 
virtue of conspicuous representation just as a way of representing something in the real 
world—in our case, a certain kind of cloth hat.  Once gustatory and expressive values have 
been ruled out, it is hard to see how this can be anything other than a cognitive virtue: a virtue 
of getting us to know or understand something.  Let us call this cognitivism about the basic 
virtue of conspicuous representation.  Here is an explicit formulation of it: 




Cognitivism about the basic virtue of conspicuous representation makes it intelligible 
that this basic virtue is a virtue, because it relates it to something we value anyway.   And it is 
in any case natural to think that art provides us with a distinctive and valuable kind of 
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understanding of the world.  We feel that we have come to understand something better when 
we have spent time with great art, and the depth that great art seems to have seems to match 
the depth of the understanding which we seem to gain from it.  Moreover, this point applies 
to the producers as well as to the consumers—the hearers, readers, or viewers—of artistic 
representation.  The representational artist naturally takes her interest in what she is 
representing to be an interest in understanding it.
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But now suppose that I am right in what I claimed at the end of the last section: that 
understanding the basic virtue of conspicuous representation will enable us to explain 
something of the point of engaging in and with artistic representation in the first place.  Call 
that the generality assumption.  The generality assumption seems to put some constraints on 
what it is about the world which conspicuous representation enables us to understand.   
The constraints are stronger, of course, the more generally important we think artistic 
representation is.  Suppose, for example, that we think the point of artistic representation is 
just that it gives a certain kind of pleasure to those of a certain temperament.  If we think this 
is the point of artistic representation, we need not expect any very ambitious understanding of 
the world to be provided by conspicuous representations.  It would be enough, for example, if 
conspicuous representation enabled us to understand the world as the source of that 
distinctive kind of pleasure. 
But those who are seriously committed to the value of art are likely to think artistic 
representation has a more fundamental importance than that.  They are likely to think that 
artistic representation does something whose value can be acknowledged without engaging  
with artistic representation (even if we cannot understand that artistic representation does it 






 (Cog) itself is well suited to this ambitious reading of the generality assumption: 
understanding the world is something which we can see some value in quite independently of 
artistic representation.  It is important to remember here that we do not generally think that 
the value of understanding the world is just that it enables us to predict and manipulate it 
more effectively.  Anyone who has a taste for philosophy or theoretical science is already 
committed to a value of understanding the world which is not merely instrumental.  But (Cog) 
has to be read in a particular way if we are to use it to express the generality assumption on 
the ambitious understanding of it.  The world which conspicuous representation enables us to 
understand must be the real world—not a world reshaped by any project of representation, or 
a world understood as a projection of some means of representation.  Let us introduce some 
technical terminology, and say that the world as it is in itself is the world as it is altogether 
independently of being represented.
13
  Then the form of cognitivism which we need for the 
ambitious reading of the generality assumption is this: 
(Cog1) The basic virtue of conspicuous representation is that it enables us to 
understand the world as it is in itself. 
If we accept (Cog1), we are committed to this: 
(A) Good conspicuous representations enable us to understand the world as it is in 
itself. 
And now we can see our problem.  The difficulty is that because conspicuous representations 
(by definition) draw attention to their own means of representation, it seems that the 
understanding they provide must involve some relation to that means of representation.  So it 
looks as if we must accept this: 
(B) Conspicuous representations can only enable us to understand the world as it 
stands to their own means of representation. 
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But (B) seems to flatly contradict (A).  And that is the problem raised by the brushwork of 
Rembrandt’s hat.  Let us call it the problem of conspicuous representation. 
  
4. Anti-Realist Solutions 
Once the problem of conspicuous representation is shown to lie in the apparent tension 
between (A) and (B), we can see that it is structurally similar to a familiar Kantian problem 
for a traditional form of realism.  We can formulate the Kantian problem as a problem about 
the apparent tension between these two claims: 
(A*) Our ways of knowing enable us to understand the world as it is in itself; 
(B*) Our ways of knowing can only enable us to understand the world as it stands 
them. 
(Obviously, in (A*) the phrase ‘world as it is in itself’ has to be understood in its usual 
general sense (roughly: as it is altogether independently of being thought or represented), 
rather than as meaning, specifically, as it is altogether independently of being represented.) 
Kant’s response (according to most natural interpretations of (Kant 1997))14 was to 
deny or modify (A*), though there is dispute about what he actually proposed.  It is natural, 
then, to suggest that the way to resolve the problem of conspicuous representation is to deny 
or modify (A).  This would be to carry over to the special case of representation a form of 
anti-realism which has its home in general metaphysics—in our conception of the relation 
between mind and the world.  I will now argue that, whatever its plausibility in general 
metaphysics, this form of anti-realism is very unattractive for the special case of 
representation: it is not plausible to deny that what conspicuous representations enable us to 
understand is altogether independent of being represented. 
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 I will consider the adaptation of two Kantian modifications to (A*) to the special case 
of representation.  First, then, we might interpret Kant as suggesting that although the object 
of our understanding when we think about the world is altogether independent of our thought, 
nevertheless the way the object is understood as being is not: the character which we 
understand the world to have depends, in part, and in some way, on the cognitive constitution 
which we bring to it.
15
  Transferring this thought to the case of representation, we might try to 
distinguish between the object of the understanding which a representation provides, on the 
one hand, and the way that object is represented as being, on the other.  Thus we might say 
that the thing in the real world which is depicted by that brushwork in the Rembrandt self-
portrait is indeed altogether independent of being represented, but the way that thing is 
represented as being is not.   
Unfortunately, transposing this form of anti-realism to the case of representation looks 
untenable for every obvious way that the object is represented as being—at least on an 
ordinary conception of what is represented and how it is represented as being.  (There is an 
issue about this ‘ordinary’ conception, of course: I will return to it at the end of section 6.)  
The object of representation is represented as being a hat, as being made of cloth of a certain 
texture and colour, as having certain folds in it, and so on.  But all of these features of the hat 
seem quite independent of being represented.  Perhaps we should be more cautious, in order 
to avoid begging the question against more general forms of anti-realism: perhaps we should 
say just that they are quite independent of being represented in paint.  But their being 
independent of representation in paint is enough to undermine this way of developing an anti-
realist response to our puzzle: we only need to reformulate both (A) and (B) to address the 
particular case of conspicuous representation in paint for the problem to recur.  It is not just 
that we ordinarily think of being a hat, being made of cloth of a certain texture, and so on, as 
features which are quite independent of being represented in paint: that independence of 
11 
 
being represented in paint is integral to the virtue of conspicuous representation in paint.  
What is interesting about conspicuous representation is precisely that calling attention to the 
medium is good as a way of representing objects and qualities which are altogether 
independent of the medium. 
 Let us, then, consider a second anti-realist approach.  We might interpret Kant as 
holding that there are different kinds of feature or aspect of objects: some features the objects 
have in themselves, independently of any relation to our understanding; but some the objects 
have only insofar as our cognitive faculties are applied to them.
16
  We might transpose this 
form of Kantianism to the problem of conspicuous representation and just attempt to question 
the independence of being represented of at least some of the ways that the object is 
represented as being.
17
   
In order to do this, we need some idea of the kind of dependence on being represented 
which might be at issue.  We want some parallel for the case of representation to a case in 
general metaphysics in which some feature of the world might plausibly be thought to be in 
some way mind-dependent.  Secondary qualities are the obvious example.  Consider, then, a 
view of secondary qualities like John McDowell’s (McDowell 1985: 111-112): 
[A]n object’s being red is understood as obtaining in virtue of the object’s being such 
as (in certain circumstances) to look, precisely, red. 
Notice that McDowell does not say here merely an object is red if and only if it is such as to 
look red: he seems to be saying that its being red is dependent on that relation to possible 
experience.  That is what makes this count as an anti-realist conception of redness.  This 
conception of the mind-dependence of secondary qualities is widely shared, and it is not 
implausible to generalize it to provide an account of the mind-dependence which Kant 





If we are to transpose this conception of mind-dependence to the case of 
representation in order to characterize an appropriate kind of representation-dependence, we 
need a reason for believing in the mind-dependence of secondary qualities which might carry 
across to representation.   It is natural to think that belief in the mind-dependence of 
secondary qualities turns on a key feature of the philosophical notion of objectivity.  A 
property or feature may be said to be objective in one or both of two senses.  The first sense is 
metaphysical; we can define it like this: 
(MO) Something is metaphysically objective if and only if its nature is wholly 
independent of any way of knowing it or thinking about it. 
This is the sense in which to say that something is objective is to say that it is just there—that 
it is real, perhaps.  But there is also an epistemic notion of objectivity.  This is related to the 
idea of an objective (that is to say, impartial) witness, or an objective (that is to say, 
independent) proof.  We can define it like this: 
(EO) Something is epistemically objective if and only if knowledge of it does not 
depend on any particular mode of access.
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It is tempting, however, to restrict what is metaphysically objective to what is epistemically 
objective, and say this: 




Call someone who holds (ME), and accepts the restriction of the metaphysically objective to 
the epistemically objective, a restrictor, and the view in general restriction.
21
 
 We can see how restriction would lead to an anti-realist view of secondary qualities.
22
  
The obvious difference between primary and secondary qualities, as we now conceive of 
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them, is that there is a special link between each secondary quality and one particular sense-
modality, whereas there is no special association between any primary quality and any 
particular mode of access.  That fact will be taken by a restrictor to provide grounds for 
denying the metaphysical objectivity of secondary qualities—grounds for claiming, in effect, 
that the very nature of secondary qualities involves some relation to experience.  Taking the 
sense-specificity of secondary qualities to be grounds for denying their metaphysical 
objectivity is a move of restriction. 
 We have here two notions of objectivity and a restricting view in general metaphysics.  
We can make sense of something very similar in the specific field of artistic representation.  
First, there is a specific form of metaphysical objectivity: 
(RMO)  Something is representationally metaphysically objective if and only if its 
nature is wholly independent of any way of representing it. 
Secondly, there is a specific form of epistemic objectivity: 
(REO) Something is representationally epistemically objective if and only if 
knowledge of it does not depend on any particular mode of representation. 
And, thirdly, we can make sense of a specific form of restriction, which would involve 
accepting this: 
(RME)  Something can only be representationally metaphysically objective if it is 
representationally epistemically objective. 
 The second anti-realist approach I want to consider claims two things: first, that there 
are some features of the way the object of a conspicuous representation is represented as 
being which are only accessible through the medium used in that representation; and second, 
that we should accept the restriction of the metaphysically objective to the epistemically 
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objective in the representational case.  We might be tempted to elaborate the resulting view as 
follows.  The basic virtue of conspicuous representation is that it enables us to see features of 
the world that we would not otherwise have seen.  These are features which can only be seen 
by way of the medium used in the representation in question, and are hence acknowledged by 
the anti-realist to be in some way dependent on representation.  But even though such 
features are dependent on representation, once we have come to see them through 
conspicuous representations our ordinary experience can be reshaped by them.  Indeed, this 
reconfiguration enriches our ordinary experience, which helps to explain what is good about 
conspicuous representation. 
 There are two difficulties with this second anti-realist approach: first, restriction is 
problematic in the general case; and secondly, there is no coherent way of applying the 
morals of the general case to artistic representation which will resolve the puzzle created by 
(A) and (B). 
 Although it is tempting to adopt restriction—that is, (ME)—in the use of the notion of 
objectivity in general metaphysics, there seems good reason to worry about it.  First, it relies 
on making a quick link between an epistemic and a metaphysical claim; and, as Saul Kripke 
has famously pointed out (1980: 34-39), claims of these kinds have different characters, and 
no quick moves between them are easily licensed.  But secondly, particular grounds for 
hesitation are provided by the very case in which it seems most tempting—the case of 
secondary qualities.  It is plausible to suggest that the particular metaphysically objective 
nature of certain qualities will ensure that particular sense-modalities are authoritative about 
them.  It is natural to think, for example, that a sense-modality which is sensitive to light will 
be authoritative over at least some light-reflectance qualities: this has nothing to do with any 
dependence of these qualities on the sense-modality—it is just a matter of the metaphysically 
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objective nature of the qualities in question.  So the special authority of a particular sense-
modality about some quality is no grounds for thinking that the quality is dependent on that 
sense-modality.  Both of these points make it natural to think that something could be 
metaphysically objective without being epistemically objective, in the general case. 
 And the idea of carrying an anti-realist approach across from general metaphysics to 
artistic representation looks problematic, when we look in detail at the features of things 
which representations in particular media might be thought to reveal to us.  There are two 
obvious conceptions of such features.  On one conception, they are features of real objects 
which we discover by considering what it is about objects which an artist is responding to.  
Call these found features: the idea is that the representation takes us back to the world to find 
there something we had not seen before.  No quick examples of these found features can be 
provided, of course, and they will not have common names: these are, after all, features we 
can only be brought to see by means of artistic representations.  The other obvious conception 
of features which artistic representations might be thought to reveal to us involves more or 
less explicit reference to the media of those representations.  What an artistic representation 
might reveal to us is that a certain relatively ordinarily accessible feature of objects is well 
captured by a certain way of using the medium of representation.  Call features like this 
meta-features: examples might be being capturable in thick paint, or being definable by a 
single brush-stroke. 
 Neither type of feature, however, provides helpful support for an anti-realist solution 
to the puzzle presented by (A) and (B).  The problem in the case of found features is that the 
relevant form of anti-realism is implausible in their case.  Anti-realism for the case of 
representation involves a claim that what is represented depends on the specific means of 
representation (rather than on thought or experience, as it would in the case of general 
16 
 
metaphysics).  And it would be argued for by means of a move of restriction—that is, 
(RME)—on the basis of the claim that the relevant features are not representationally 
epistemically objective, because knowledge of them depends on a particular medium of 
representation.   
The problem is that the claim that these features are not representationally 
epistemically objective seems clearly wrong.  It is not only hard to sustain: it seems to miss 
the point of artistic representation—at least from the artist’s point of view.  First, there is no 
obvious reason to think that representational media are limited in what they can represent; so 
there is no reason to think that what can be represented in one medium cannot be represented 
in another.  There seems no special problem with the idea that colours can be used to 
represent sounds, for example.  And though it is sometimes thought that no words can capture 
what a picture gives us, this does not undermine the present point, since it is not clear that 
what a picture gives us is nothing but features of the objects represented (and no other words 
can capture what even a haiku gives us).   But secondly, it is plausible that in the basic case of 
artistic representation the whole point is to represent what we can see independently is there 
in the world.  In the basic case, the artist will have some real object before her, as the model 
for representation, and her challenge will be to represent in the medium of her art what she 
can see in the object when she looks away from the easel and towards it.  Found features of 
objects seem to be representationally epistemically objective.  It is true enough that restriction 
is unproblematic in their case; but that is only because the relevant anti-realism is 
implausible—which rules out an anti-realist solution to the problem posed by (A) and (B). 
 What I have called meta-features, by contrast, seem to be unproblematically 
representation-dependent—quite independently of any move of restriction—but what makes 
their representation-dependence unproblematic also makes it implausible that they provide 
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the basis for an explanation of the point of engaging with artistic representation in the first 
place.  It is natural to think that seeing features of the world as capturable in thick paint or 
definable by a single brush-stroke will indeed enrich our experience, but that enrichment 
depends on an antecedent appreciation of what is good about capturing a feature like this in 
thick paint, or defining a feature like this by a single brush-stroke.  And that ensures that an 
appeal to meta-features will enter the debate too late.  The aim was to show that conspicuous 
representation is worthwhile because there is something distinctive which it enables us to 
understand.  Features which we can only know by engaging with some particular medium of 
representation were supposed to be candidates for this distinctive thing which conspicuous 
representation enables us to understand.  But although meta-features may be things which can 
only be understood through engaging with some representational medium, it cannot be 
because it enables us to understand them that conspicuous representation is worthwhile.   
 I have looked at the two obvious kinds of feature which conspicuous representations 
might be thought to reveal to us: found features and meta-features.  I have provided no 
argument that all features which representations might reveal to us fall into one or other of 
these two categories, but it is not easy to think of any that do not.  The problem is this: if we 
are to say that conspicuous representation is worthwhile because it reveals features of the 
world to us, the features it reveals must at least present themselves as representationally 
metaphysically objective.  In that case, we will only be able to adopt an anti-realist solution to 
our problem—in effect, modifying or revising (A)—by denying that the features are 
representationally epistemically objective, and making some appeal to representational 
restriction.  But in all readily imaginable cases, it is just not plausible to deny that the features 







5. The Form of a Better Solution 
Our puzzle was that we apparently have good reason to accept two claims which seem to 
contradict each other: 
(A) Good conspicuous representations enable us to understand the world as it is in 
itself. 
(B) Conspicuous representations can only enable us to understand the world as it 
stands to their own means of representation. 
We have just seen that modifying or revising (A) is problematic.  In taking conspicuous 
representation seriously we are holding firmly to (B).  We seem driven, then, to conclude that, 
despite initial appearances, (A) and (B) do not, in fact, contradict each other. 
 Happily, the conclusion we are driven to is also correct: there is no contradiction here.  
The quickest way of seeing this is to combine our two propositions in a third: 
(C) Conspicuous representations enable us to understand the world as it is in itself 
as it stands to their own means of representation. 
I think this third proposition characterizes in outline the point of conspicuous 
representation—and ultimately the point of engaging in artistic representation in the first 
place. 
 (C) may be a little bewildering at first reading.  To make sense of it we need to 
distinguish between two things: 
(i) The object (in a generous sense) of the understanding provided by 
conspicuous representations; 
(ii) What conspicuous representations enable us to understand about that object. 
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What I am calling a generous sense of the notion of an object of understanding is a sense 
which precisely does not limit it in the way proposed by the first anti-realist response 
considered in the last section.  That response distinguished between the object of 
representation and the way that object is represented as being.  The generous sense makes no 
such distinction.  So in the Rembrandt self-portrait, the hat may be counted as (part of) the 
object of understanding in the generous sense—but so may the hat’s being a hat, the hat’s 
being made of cloth of a certain texture, the hat’s being white, the hat’s having a fold across it, 
and so on.  Anything which, using an everyday conception of representation, we might 
ordinarily think a representation represents about something in the real world counts as the 
object of the understanding provided by that representation, in this generous sense.  (I will 
come back to this ‘ordinary’ conception of representation at the end of the next section.) 
Now we can explain (C).  In (C) (and (A)), the phrase ‘the world as it is in itself’ 
characterizes what I am here calling the object (in the generous sense) of the understanding 
provided by conspicuous representations—that is, (i)—and the phrase ‘as it stands to their 
own means of representation’ characterizes what conspicuous representations enable us to 
understand about that object—that is, (ii) (as it does also in (B)).  I think the distinction 
between (i) and (ii) is what gives conspicuous representation—and, indeed, artistic 
representation in general—its basic point. 
The problem comes when we take the ‘as’ in both (A) and (B) to characterize features 
of whatever real thing is represented.  The anti-realist solution considered in the last section 
failed because it did not question that assumption.  What that failure shows is that what is 
special about artistic representation, in the basic case, is not that it provides us with access to 
something in the world which is not available to us otherwise; but that it gives us a special 
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kind of understanding of aspects of the world which are in principle available independently 
of representation.   
 
6. The Matter of the Solution 
(C), as it has been elaborated, shows us how it is formally possible to solve the problem of 
conspicuous representation.  But this approach will not be convincing without some 
substantial account of the kind of understanding of the world as it is in itself which 
conspicuous representation might be thought to provide (what I have just separated as (ii)). 
 We are looking for a kind of understanding which is provided by conspicuous 
representation just as such—independently of any expressive or gustatory virtues it might 
have.  And we are looking for something that might apply to conspicuous representation in 
any medium.  The key relation seems to be between the real object (in the generous sense) 
which is represented and the medium in which the conspicuous representation represents it.  
We are familiar with the idea of objects of representation: they are what are represented by 
particular representations.  For our purposes, we need to understand them as the things or 
features of the real world which are represented.  (After all, we are not concerned with what 
can be ‘seen-in’ a painting.)  To get what we want, I think we need the idea of an object of a 
representational medium: an object of a representational medium is a real thing or feature (or 
thing with its features) which is a possible object of representation within that medium.  So 
everything which is actually represented in a given medium is an object of that medium, but 
not every object of a medium has actually been represented by any representation constructed 
in the medium. 
 We can now use this notion to propose a simple development of (Cog), our initial 
cognitivism about  conspicuous representation.  Here is what I propose: 
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(Cog2)  The basic virtue of a conspicuous representation is that it reveals what it 
represents as the object of its own medium of representation. 
I want first (in this section) to explain in more detail how this should be understood: that 
should make clear how it is the conspicuousness of conspicuous representation which does 
the work.  After that (in the next section) I will make clear how what is revealed is 
nevertheless something about the world as it is in itself which we can have reason to be 
interested in, quite independently of any interest in representation as such. 
 The importance of the idea of an object of a medium of representation, in the sense 
just explained, can be seen by considering representation from the artist’s point of view.  
When a representational artist sets about representing something in the real world, she is 
constantly aware of that thing as presenting distinctive challenges and opportunities for 
representation within her medium of representation: in fact, this is precisely what makes 
representation interesting for the artist.  These challenges and opportunities are presented by 
the object precisely as an object of the medium, in the sense I have explained.  What the artist  
produces is a response to those challenges and opportunities, and the resulting representation 
reflects the challenges and opportunities themselves, as well as the choices the artist has 
made in response to them.  When we understand the way the medium has been used in a 
particular representation—the way the paint has been applied with a brush in the hat in the 
Rembrandt self-portrait, for example—we are understanding the object of representation—
that real cloth hat, for example—as presenting those challenges and opportunities for 
representation in the medium, the challenges and opportunities to which this particular way of 
using the medium is a response.  Sometimes the use of a medium can be self-effacing: this 
can happen either when an effort is made to prevent the medium calling attention to itself, or 
when the use of the medium follows some over-familiar formula.  When the use of a medium 
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is self-effacing, it is easy not to notice that the object of representation—the real thing 
represented by the use of the medium—presents distinctive challenges and opportunities for 
representation in the medium.  But when the use of the medium calls attention to itself—
when it is conspicuous, in our sense—we are forced to reconsider the relation between the 
medium and the object of representation, and to be aware once again of the object as an 
object of the medium: that is, as something which presents distinctive challenges and 
opportunities for representation in that medium. 
 Being aware of something as an object of the medium is a kind of modal awareness—
an awareness of the object as presenting certain possibilities.  It is also an awareness of a 
distinctive kind, which is captured by the use of ‘as’ in a phrase like ‘awareness of the thing 
as an object of the medium’.  In general, when we say that a representation reveals something 
as being a certain way, what is thereby said to be revealed cannot be captured by means of 
the most obviously corresponding ‘that’-clause.  If a representation reveals something as 
being φ, more is involved than its simply revealing that the relevant thing is φ.  For example, 
the brushwork in the Rembrandt self-portrait reveals the real hat which it represents as made 
of cloth; but this involves more than merely that the hat is made of cloth: the clothiness, so to 
speak, is, in a certain sense, made present to us.  We might put this point by saying that in 
general the content of what is revealed about the real world by a representation is not simply 
propositional.  It may in the end (perhaps) be possible to capture this content by means of 
‘that’-clauses,23 but we will need an indefinite number of them, and this ‘that’-clause 
expression must strike us as derivative: in the case of Rembrandt’s hat, for example, we are 
first of all presented with the clothiness of the hat, which we can then characterize 
extensively (perhaps limitlessly) by means of sentences suited to fill ‘that’-clauses.24 
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 The same point applies to the way in which conspicuous representation reveals 
something as the object of the medium: it does not merely reveal that the thing is an object of 
the medium, or that it presents this or that challenge for representation in the medium.  A full 
range of challenges and opportunities presented by the thing
25—which include, of course, the 
challenges and opportunities presented by the qualities of the thing—is laid open for 
contemplation and perpetual revisiting.  This does not preclude the possibility of it striking us 
immediately that this or that feature is difficult or interesting to capture in the medium, but 
these propositional judgements always appear against a wider background of the thing’s 
simply appearing as being open to representation in an indefinite number of ways.
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 This is why it is important to insist on the indexical in the key phrase in (Cog2).  A 
particular piece of conspicuous representation will always reveal what it represents as 
presenting challenges and opportunities for its own medium of representation, and it is only 
from within the perspective of the medium itself that we can be sure that exactly the right 
indefinite range of possibilities is presented.  We may be able to capture a good deal of that 
range of possibilities from the point of view of another medium—by describing in words, for 
example, the task which an artist faces in representing some feature of the real world in a 
non-verbal medium—but we cannot expect to capture the same range of possibilities from 
that external perspective.  (In general, we would expect a commentary in words to help us to 
get into the point of view of a non-verbal medium, so that we are then able to understand a 
representation made in that medium from the inside, as it were.) 
 This means that the understanding provided by conspicuous representation, on this 
proposal, will be essentially perspectival.  But it does not follow that what is thereby 
understood is perspectival.  The object of the understanding is nothing less than the real thing 
which is represented, including all its objective qualities.  What conspicuous representation 
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enables us to understand is nothing less than the world as it is in itself—as it presents 
challenges and opportunities for representation in its own medium of representation. 
 It seems to me that this is a plausible account of what we actually get from 
conspicuous representation.  Two features in particular make it attractive.  First, it makes 
sense of the feeling that we all have that a proper response to a great work of representational 
art involves dwelling with it.  Because it makes the point of conspicuous representation to be 
to reveal what is represented as presenting an indefinite range of challenges and opportunities 
for representation within its own medium, the proposal makes a proper appreciation of 
conspicuous representation depend on appreciating something which provides indefinite 
space for lingering.  And secondly, the proposed account makes sense of conspicuous 
representation from the artist’s point of view, as much as from the point of view of the viewer, 
reader, or audience.  For the representational artist’s concern is precisely to consider and 
confront the challenges for representation which the real world presents, and in taking the 
point of conspicuous representation to be to reveal those challenges, the proposal allows 
conspicuous representation to be a kind of record of the artist’s achievement, through which 
her facing of the challenges can be relived. 
 What this solution to the puzzle presented by conspicuous representation depends 
on—like any other solution which resolves the puzzle by adopting something like (C)—is a 
distinction between what a representation represents (which may include all kinds of features 
of a thing) and the perspective from which it represents it.  In this respect, the solution 
endorses what we may think of as an ordinary conception of representation.  But there is a 
certain not-quite-contemporary tendency in art criticism, to describe novels, for example, as 
being about the language in which they are written, or more generally, to describe all art as 





Within this tendency, the distinction on which the solution to the puzzle depends will be hard 
to draw: if the medium of representation is conspicuous, it will be tempting to think that it is 
part of what the work is about, and hence part of what it represents. 
 We need not engage in the uncertain business of linguistic legislation, but we have a 
clear reason for preferring to stick to the ordinary conception of representation, and to resist 
this extension of the term.  For this extension precisely smears together things which need to 
be kept apart if we are to solve the problem of conspicuous representation; and we have no 
general reason to think that if something is conspicuous in a representation it is really what 
the representation represents. 
  
7. Meeting the Demands of the Generality Assumption 
We have an account which formally removes the puzzle which conspicuous representation 
presents, and which seems to characterize what actually matters to us about conspicuous 
representation.  What is not yet clear is how this account meets the generality assumption on 
its ambitious reading, and that assumption, so understood, was crucial in the initial setting up 
of the problem. 
 The generality assumption was this: understanding the basic virtue of conspicuous 
representation will enable us to explain something of the point of engaging in and with 
artistic representation in the first place.  And the ambitious reading of it arose from a sense 
that there is a serious point in artistic representation.  Specifically, what it requires is this: 
artistic representation does something whose value can be acknowledged without engaging in 




(1) The value of understanding something as presenting challenges and 
opportunities for representation within a medium is a basic value of artistic 
representation in general; 
(2) The value of understanding something as presenting challenges and 
opportunities for representation within a medium is a value whose value status 
can be acknowledged without engaging in or with artistic representation. 
 I will not attempt to provide a decisive argument for (1) here, but I will deal with one 
obvious worry.  Someone might think that conspicuous representation—representation which 
calls attention to the medium of representation—is unusual, and its appreciation the preserve 
of a certain kind of aesthetic sophisticate.  But in fact, I think, all representation, in any sense 
which is at all relevant to artistic representation,
28
 is conspicuous: all such representation calls 
attention to the medium of representation to some degree.  To identify certain representations 
as conspicuous representations is not to contrast them with representations which are not 
conspicuous at all, but to mark them as conspicuous as among representations, conspicuous 
even for representations. 
 To see this, let us take in particular the case of trompe l’oeil painting, which is often 
thought to be problematic for theories of representation which emphasize the importance of 
being aware of the medium of representation.
29
  Consider, to begin with, a trompe l’oeil 
violin painted on the back of a door in a great house.  If you look across the room when the 
door is closed, you think there is a violin hanging on the back of the door.  And then, when 
the door is opened, you see that the violin is a painted violin, and there is no real violin there.  
It might be thought that the effect here depends on the medium being so self-effacing as to be 
invisible: depends, that is, on the representation being completely inconspicuous.  But I 
described two moments: a moment of illusion, when we simply think there is a violin hanging 
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on the back of a door; and a moment of realization, when we see that it is a painted violin.  I 
take it that when we are under the illusion we are not appreciating the painting as art, or as a 
representation: we have no idea, after all, that it is art, or is any kind of representation.  So it 
is natural to think that we need to consider instead the moment, after the door has opened, 
when we gaze in wonder that flat paint can be made to seem so like a violin leaning out at an 
angle from a peg on the back of a door.  This is the moment when we acknowledge and 
appreciate the painting as a representation, and the appreciation depends on a full 
consciousness of the limitations of the medium—in particular the flatness of the painted 
surface—for representing something like a violin.  It seems to me that even in this simple 
case what we value is the sense of the painting’s having met a challenge posed by the real 
object represented, and what we come to understand about the real object represented is 
precisely the way its character presents a challenge for the medium of representation. 
 The key point here is that representation of any kind which is relevant to art is not 
illusion, and recognizing that something is a representation is precisely not being subject to 
any illusion.
30
  That means that we can set aside as irrelevant to our concerns a different kind 
of trompe l’oeil painting, whose purpose is not, like the trompe l’oeil violin just considered, 
to be discovered, but precisely to remain concealed.  We might think here of certain 
architectural trompe l’oeil effects, whose business is to give the illusion of more space than 
there is, or that a building is made of different materials from those of which it is actually 
made.  The value of this illusionistic kind of trompe l’oeil painting lies just in the 
instrumental value of the effects created by the illusion, which seems clearly distinct from 
any value of artistic representation.   
 Of course, there are particular examples of architectural trompe l’oeil painting whose 
status is ambiguous: either it is indeterminate whether they are representational or 
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illusionistic, or they are in some way both representational and illusionistic.  But this does not 
undermine the central point, that insofar as something is a representation, in any sense which 
is relevant to artistic representation, it calls attention to its own medium of representation to 
some degree.  There is therefore no reason to deny that all representations of the relevant kind 
are conspicuous, to some extent at least.  So the obvious worry about (1) can be dealt with. 
 Now to (2).  First of all, we need to remember that we are working within the 
framework of a distinction which was introduced before (in section 5)—between these two 
things: 
(i) The object (in a generous sense) of the understanding provided by 
conspicuous representations; 
(ii) What conspicuous representations enable us to understand about that object. 
So to establish (2), we need to show that the object, in the generous sense, of the 
understanding provided by conspicuous representations is something we have an interest in 
understanding, independently of representation; and that the kind of understanding of that 
object which conspicuous representation provides is a kind whose value we can understand 
without engaging in representation. 
I suggest that the object of the understanding provided by conspicuous representations 
is just this: the qualitative character of the real world—or of whatever it is in the real world 
that the representations represent.  Conspicuous representations help us to understand what 
things are like.  In describing the fact that the brushwork in the painting of Rembrandt’s hat 
reveals the hat as made of cloth it was natural to say this: the clothiness of the hat is made 
present to us.  This seems to me exactly what conspicuous representation does in general, 
whatever kind of thing it might be that is represented: a tragedy, for example, might reveal 
the qualitative character of grief—what grief is like—and a poem what it is like to be in love. 
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It is not just that conspicuous representation enables us to understand the qualitative 
character of the world: it is plausible to think that it is the conspicuousness of conspicuous 
representation which does the work, if the account I offered in the last section is correct.  It is 
helpful to compare what is provided by conspicuous representation with what is revealed to 
the eye of the engineer.  If we look at the world with the eye of an engineer, we consider what 
we look at both in terms of its possible contribution to practical goals we might have, and in 
terms of the possible differences to it which different interventions of ours might make.  
What is thereby revealed is the practical or causal character of the world.  According to the 
account presented in the last section, if we look at the world with the eye of a painter—or of a 
representational artist more generally—our concern is at least one stage further removed from 
the practical and causal.  We do not consider the world in terms of the differences to it which 
our interventions might make, and we consider it only in terms of the challenges and 
opportunities it provides for representation, rather than for any practical goal.  What is left 
when we abstract from the practical and causal character of things?  We seem bound to say: 
just their qualitative character—their look or their feel. 
 It seems clear that we have a concern with this qualitative character quite 
independently of any concern with representation.  At the simplest level, we are just 
interested in the way things look and the way things feel.  It is also plausible to suggest that 
an understanding of the qualitative character of things is a necessary prerequisite to every 
kind of further understanding.  This is true not only of the kind of understanding pursued by 
engineering, which is naturally thought to be framed by an interest in the qualitative character 




 Our account seems able, then, to provide the first part of what was needed for (2): it 
gives us an object of the understanding provided by conspicuous representation which we 
have an interest in quite independently of representation.  But why should we value the 
understanding of it which conspicuous representation provides?  It is not as if we have no 
other access to the qualitative character of the world.  Rather, what conspicuous 
representation does is enable us to hold the qualitative character of things in view, so that we 
can explore it indefinitely as we pursue the range of possibilities for representation that a 
particular conspicuous representation reveals to us.   Different representational media will 
offer different opportunities for exploration of the same qualitative character of things, since 
the same qualitative character will present different challenges to different media.  Different 
opportunities for exploration will be provided even by different kinds of conspicuous 
representation within the same medium, since we will not always be aware of every 
possibility for a given medium, and new ways of representing show us new possibilities. 
 Seen in this way, artistic representation plays a role in relation to the qualitative 
character of things which is analogous to the role which experiment plays in relation to the 
causal and practical character of the world.   And conspicuous representation provides an 
understanding of the qualitative character of the world which is analogous to the 
understanding of the world’s causal and practical character which is provided by 
experimental experience.  In both cases the understanding which is gained is an 
understanding of the world as it stands in relation to some project of our own.  But this does 
not mean that it is anything less than the world as it is in itself that is understood: that is the 
point of the distinction between (i) and (ii).  And it is not as if this understanding of the world 
as it stands to a project of ours  is a poor second-best to the understanding which would be 
gained by just considering an object, and not considering it in relation to anything else.  In 
fact, an attempt to understand the world without considering how it stands to some project of 
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ours would provide no significant understanding at all: it would be little more than a blank 
stare.  If it is the qualitative character of the world which we aim to understand, and if we aim 
for more than a blank stare can provide, it is hard to see what could provide the understanding 
we want –other than conspicuous representation.31 
 The proposal is, then, that the basic virtue of conspicuous representation is that it 
enables us to understand the world as it is in itself as it stands to the medium of representation; 
and that the reason why that is a virtue is that what the relation to the medium of 
representation reveals about the world is its qualitative character, which is something for 
which we have a concern quite independently of any interest in representation, but which we 
can only contemplate and explore in its relation to some medium of representation. 
 
8. Realism 
An obvious moral for the general issue of realism arises out of this discussion.  We saw that 
the problem of conspicuous representation depended on the apparent tension between the 
following two claims: 
(A) Good conspicuous representations enable us to understand the world as it is in 
itself; 
(B) Conspicuous representations can only enable us to understand the world as it 
stands to their own means of representation. 
And we saw the obvious structural similarity between this apparent tension and the apparent 
tension which the Kantian uses to undermine traditional realism—the tension, that is, 
between these two claims: 





(B*) Our ways of knowing can only enable us to understand the world as it stands 
them. 
But we found that a revision of (A) in a Kantian spirit looked implausible.  That led us to find 
a way of recognizing that (A) and (B) do not, in fact, contradict each other.  The 
compatibility of (A) and (B) was expressed in this claim: 
 (C) Conspicuous representations enable us to understand the world as it is in itself 
as it stands to their own means of representation. 
In the last two sections I have been offering an interpretation of the italicized clause here 
which aims to make sense of (C), and hence to make good the thought that (A) and (B) are 
compatible. 
But if (A) and (B) do not contradict each other, then why should we think that (A*) 
and (B*) contradict each other either?  If they do not, the Kantian reason for denying (A*) 
seems to disappear.  It looks as if we should be able to make sense of a thoroughgoing 
realism of a fairly traditional kind if we can make sense of this: 
 (C*) Our ways of knowing enable us to understand the world as it is in itself as it 
stands to our ways of knowing. 
In order to do that, we would need a substantial interpretation of the italicized clause here 
which would make sense of (C*).  That must be a task for another occasion.  In the meantime, 
we have an answer to the question why we should be interested in artistic representation in 
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1
 The example is Wollheim’s own (Wollheim 1987: 46), although in his case the boy is ‘seen-in’ a stain on a 
wall. 
2
 The issue here corresponds to Goodman’s identification of two uses of a phrase like ‘painting of a woman’: for 
one use (the one relevant to my concerns) there must be a real woman of whom the painting is a painting; for the 
other (the one relevant to ‘seeing-in’) there need not be (Goodman: 1976: 21-23).  See also (Budd 1993: 154-5). 
3
 This is not to deny that there are differences, of course: for example, a woman ‘seen-in’ a painting seems more 
obviously to be an object of experience than a character in a novel is. 
4
 This point also distinguishes my concerns from those which dominate Michael Podro’s discussions of 
depiction in his (1998)—despite Podro’s particular interest in Rembrandt. 
5
 Hopkins’s principal examples are also mentioned by Podro (1998: 16): a drawing, and later an etching, by 
Rembrandt of Jan Cornelius Sylvius.  Podro is interested in these pictures as examples of depictions which lead 
us ‘to reflect on and re-imagine the transition between the actuality of the medium and the represented subject’, 
and he explicitly describes the ‘represented subject’ as ‘fictive’. 
6
 We can also set aside another issue that might muddy the waters here (as in other similar examples).  It is 
sometimes said that this painting is unfinished.  Whatever exactly it is for a painting to be unfinished, the issue 
can only affect things that might depend on the artist’s intention—perhaps here what the brushwork might be 
thought to express. But we have just seen that expression is irrelevant, and nothing about the artist’s intention 
matters for our problem beyond the fact that he meant to put those brushstrokes there (even if he also expected 
to paint over them later). 
7
 This means, of course, that if narrative fictions are counted as representational art, they will have to be 
regarded as representing things in the real world (and not just fictional characters and their doings).  This seems 
plausible enough anyway, though the real things in question are likely to be general: love, grief, and betrayal are 
obvious examples. 
8
 It should, then, give us some purchase on what Dominic McIver Lopes calls ‘the puzzle of mimesis’ (Lopes 
2005).  But my problem is more general than Lopes’s ‘puzzle of mimesis’: it arises for forms of representation 
other than depiction.  Furthermore, framing it does not require commitment either to anything like Lopes’s 
‘mimesis thesis’—according to which ‘pictures typically elicit experiences as of the scenes they depict, which 
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experiences resemble, in important respects, face-to-face experiences of the same scenes’—or to anything like 
Lopes’s ‘pictorial evaluation thesis’—according to which ‘to evaluate a picture as a picture is, in part, to 
evaluate it as eliciting experiences of the scene it depicts’ (Lopes 2005: 20). 
9
 This follows John McDowell’s conception of philosophical ‘How possible?’ questions (McDowell 1996: xiii). 
10
 The idea that understanding is the cognitive state which art is meant to produce is championed by, for 
example, Catherine Elgin (2002)—though it is anyway natural. 
11
 This is what I think Podro misses, when he says: ‘The artists whose work will concern us did not set out to 
show the look of the world as something previously known, but rather to extend the thread of recognition in new 
and complex structures of their own’ (1998: vii).  By ‘extending the thread of recognition’ Podro means 
something like: extending the range of depictions ‘in’ which we can ‘see’ familiar things—using ‘seeing-in’ 
here in Wollheim’s sense.   
12
 Compare the claim of Podro’s quoted in the previous footnote (Podro 1998: vii).  Important and interesting 
though ‘extending the thread of recognition’ in his sense is, it is not important or interesting enough for the 
ambitious understanding of the generality thesis.   
13
 This is obviously a technical definition of the phrase, but the wider sense, more obviously reminiscent of Kant, 
should not be forgotten, and will be relevant to sections 4 and 8.  What do I mean ‘altogether independently of 
representation’?  I mean: with no dependence of any kind (causal, conceptual, constitutive, or whatever) on 
representation. 
14
 That is, the ‘metaphysical’ interpretations (whether ‘two-‘ or ‘one-world’ interpretations)—as opposed to 
Henry Allison’s ‘epistemological’ interpretation (Allison 1983).  In fact, we will be looking in particular to 
‘one-world’ interpretations for the case of artistic representation, since everyone accepts that something of what 
is represented is independent of artistic representation. 
15
 This kind of ‘one-world’ interpretation is suggested by (Kant 1997: B306); it also seems to be assumed, e.g., 
at (Goodman 1978: 6). 
16
 This is the kind of ‘one-world’ interpretation suggested by Rae Langton (Langton 1998)—more particularly 
as adapted by Lucy Allais (Allais 2006). 
17
 Of course, we must acknowledge that some features represented in some works are not altogether independent 
of representation.  Some works involve what we may call reflexive representations: that is, representations 
which are concerned to represent features of their own medium of representation—paintings in which painters 
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are at work painting, for example.  But as long as we keep to a reasonably ordinary conception of what works of 
art may be taken to be representing (and again, I will return to the issue of that ordinary conception later) 
reflexive representations, in this sense, cannot be the basic case; and this second anti-realist approach does not 
rely on the special case of reflexive representation. (It might be noted that Podro’s discussion of the Rembrandt 
self-portrait which has provided our central example focusses primarily on the fact that it is a piece of reflexive 
representation: ‘we see the depicted Rembrandt seeing himself in the very painting that is the condition of our 
seeing him’ (Podro 1998: 103).) 
18
 This is argued in (Allais 2007). 
19
 This notion of objectivity seems to be of central importance in Thomas Nagel’s (1986), for example. 
20
 I take it that the converse of (ME) is relatively uncontroversial. 
21
 It is tempting to think that this kind of restriction of the metaphysically objective to the epistemically 
objective provides some of the motivation for reductive physicalism—the view that physics describes all the 
facts: the assumption being that the physical is above all epistemically objective.   
22
 It is not exactly clear what underlies McDowell’s own anti-realism about secondary qualities.  One motivation 
seems to be the simple intuition that secondary qualities are ‘essentially phenomenal’ (1985: 113). If this is not 
itself an assumption of anti-realism, then ‘essentially phenomenal’ means something like essentially qualitative.  
The question would then be why the essentially qualitative should be understood anti-realistically, and it is at 
least arguable that a move of restriction is what does the work.  But there is also a hint of an independent use of 
restriction.  McDowell says that to adopt a primary-quality model of fearfulness would be to think that 
fearfulness itself is ‘intelligible from a standpoint independent of the propensity to fear’ (1985: 120-121); and 
this looks like the claim that fearfulness is not epistemically objective, which would then be the first step in an 
argument that relied on restriction. 
23
 I use the word ‘capture’ here in order to rule out trivializing reductions of content to what can be expressed in 
a ‘that’-clause.  A trivializing reduction of the content of Rembrandt’s representation of the hat as being made of 
cloth might take the following form: ‘the picture shows that the hat is made of cloth like that’—where the final 
‘that’ accompanies a pointing to the picture itself.  I take this not to capture the content, since the content is only 
explained by appeal to the picture. 
24
 Note that there is no immediate incompatibility between this and Scruton’s claim, ‘Representation … is 
essentially propositional’ (Scruton 1998: 72)—although in fact I think that claim is false. 
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25
 I say cautiously ‘a full range’, rather than ‘the full range’, because different ways of painting (for example) 
naturally provoke us to think of different ranges of challenges and opportunities. 
26
 This echoes Kant’s thought that in the pure judgement of beauty ‘the powers of cognition … are … in free 
play, since no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition’ (Kant 2000: 5:217).   
27
 For an extreme, and completely generalized, version of this, consider Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s claim that ‘In 
a sense language never has anything to do with anything but itself’ (Merleau-Ponty 1973: 115). 
28
 The principal purpose of this qualifying phrase is to prevent the application of the claim to anything which 
someone who regards all intentionality as representational would count as a representation.  In particular, it is 
not meant to apply to ordinary perception of the ordinary real world. 
29
 Wollheim, for example, thinks that trompe l’oeil paintings do not involve the ‘two-foldedness’ of ‘seeing-in’, 
and so are not strictly speaking representations: Wollheim (1987: 62) (supported by Lopes (2005: 38)).  John 
Hyman disagrees (Hyman 2006: 132-3). 
30
 Despite some ambivalence Ernst Gombrich, accepts that illusion sometimes plays a role (Gombrich 2002). 
31
 It is natural to think here of the compulsive desire of the wine-lover to find a way of describing the complex 
harmony of flavours which she finds in a great wine. 
32
 Once again, of course, the phrase ‘world as it is in itself’ is to be understood here in its usual general sense. 
